Abstract
Introduction
The civil unrest that has plagued Iraq over the last couple of years may be traced to sectarian rivalry, ambitions of autonomy for specifi c regions of the country, the interference of foreign fi ghters, and perhaps, even, the meddling of neighbouring states. 1 As one looks forward, however, each of these ' drivers of unrest ' is likely to be accentuated by the matter of oil (hereinafter also referred to as oil and gas, or as hydrocarbons, or as petroleum). Indeed, the recently completed Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group Report to President George W. Bush on the US foreign policy options in Iraq notes the signifi cance of questions regarding Iraqi oil in bringing stability to that nation-state. 2 Oil is Iraq's principal natural patrimony. Traditionally, Iraq has long been regarded as holding the world's fourth largest proven national reserves, right behind Saudi Arabia, Canada and Iran.
3 By some more recent estimates, Iraq's reserves are thought to place it in the number two spot. 4 Short of alleged suspicions about weapons of mass destruction, asserted links to al-Qaeda, thin hopes of creating a ' beacon of democracy ' in the Middle East, and its strategic location in a geopolitically important region of the globe, little other reason exists for the coalition's March 2003 military invasion of Iraq than the importance of oil. 5 During the inter-war years following the 1991 First Gulf War, the United Nations supervised the international sale of Iraqi oil, with the objectives being to increase assurance that revenues were not diverted by Iraq to prohibited weapons activities, and that the humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq were being met. 6 revenues generated by export oil sales. 7 The revenues from oil sales and the IDF have operated with insulation from legal claims, 8 thus freeing up activities and monies for concentration on Iraqi reconstruction.
Until the Security Council's adoption of Resolution 1723 on 28 November 2006, 9 the IDF's authorization was set to expire roughly four weeks later at the end of the year. 10 Both the IDF, and the immunity enjoyed by it and the revenues it handles, are now set to expire on 31 December 2007. 11 The arrival of that date will witness an undoubted rush of assorted characters, many with less than noble ambitions and no particular direct long-term interest in stabilizing the political and security situation in the Middle East, all seeking access to Iraq's oil revenues. Government offi cials in that country and company executives from outside, as well as legal claimants from various locations, will be freed to pursue the almighty dollar, whether through clever or shady business dealings or purportedly legitimate requests for compensation fi led in appropriate judicial forums.
As though to add further complication, in late October of 2006, Kurdish regional governmental authorities in the north of Iraq published a petroleum law asserting extensive control over oil resources situated in their region. 12 The Kurdish law was certainly based on the fact that the earlier adopted 2005 Iraqi Constitution 13 provided for a politically weakened central government and substantial control over petroleum resources to be vested in producing regions.
14 Aside from showing concern with the Kurdish approach, 15 17 but sources close to the process disclose that numerous diffi cult issues are far from being defi nitively resolved. In any event, once the drafting of a national legislative measure is completed, it still must secure the approval of Iraq's Council of Ministers and the Parliament prior to becoming law.
Taking the coalescence of these various developments and previously referenced dates for the expiry of relevant Security Council resolutions as a cue, it seems fi tting to briefl y recall the background of the UN resolutions speaking to the matter of Iraqi oil and the revenues generated by its sale. Such an examination provides insight by which to better understand and evaluate the picture soon to unfold before us. While the details of that picture may concern such mundane questions as the role of regional versus central governmental authorities regarding oil, the relationship between the Iraqi Oil Ministry and the state-owned oil companies, the assessment of oil taxes and the distribution of revenues generated by oil and gas production, and the nature of legal arrangements to be employed when seeking foreign oil companies to undertake exploitation activities in Iraq, it is the Security Council's resolutions on Iraqi oil that provide the foundational support, the basic underpinning for all we are about to witness. Each of the other four matters just referenced is, in its own right, of genuine signifi cance. Yet in the absence of familiarity with the Security Council's resolutions upon which they rest, any understanding of those matters is necessarily incomplete. 
The First Gulf War Oil Resolutions
Although a wide range of Security Council resolutions were adopted in conjunction with the First Gulf War, 18 three central resolutions were issued to address, among other things, the matter of Iraqi oil resources. Security Council Resolution 661, adopted shortly after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990, is critical to any understanding of subsequent Council promulgations on that score.
19 That resolution established a complete trade embargo with Iraq, thereby effectively preventing Iraq from being able to engage in exportation of its hydrocarbons. The resolution's operative language on that matter can be found in paragraph 3(a). In the relevant part, it provided that the Security Council of the United Nations ' [d] ecides that all States shall prevent … [t]he import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq … exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution. ' 20 Given the obvious revenue signifi cance to Iraq of the impermissibility of Member States committing to purchase Iraqi oil, Resolution 661 ' s embargo set in motion the situation that cascaded into the food, medicine and humanitarian item crisis that eventually necessitated the establishment of the UN Oil-for-Food Programme. 21 As if to presage the creation of the administrative body that would eventually be charged with the task of overseeing the Oil-for-Food Programme, Resolution 661 provided in paragraph 6 for an entity to supervise compliance with its own dictates regarding the trade embargo on Iraq. 22 Essentially, that entity was to be a ' Committee ' of the members of the Security Council. Its charge was to collect information concerning activities of Member States and review that information to make sure there was full compliance with the trade obligations imposed by Resolution 661.
During conjunction with the previously alluded to paragraph 22 of Resolution 687, 32 two ideas were beginning to emerge: at some point (perhaps because of Iraqi compliance with weapons inspection obligations or because of needs for compensation fund revenues) exports of Iraqi hydrocarbons would resume; and, when that point was reached and revenues began to fl ow in, the United Nations would not be content to permit the Saddam Hussein regime that remained in power to have direct and complete control over those revenues.
By the summer of 1991, the need for monies to cover the costs of operating UNSCOM and take care of war claims entertained by the Compensation Commission, as well as provide for food, medicines, and other humanitarian supplies desperately needed by the Iraqi people, 33 suggested a loosening of Resolution 661 ' s embargo on export sales of Iraqi oil. On 15 August, the Security Council responded with the adoption of Resolution 706. 34 The ninth paragraph of that resolution's Preamble referenced the need for funds to cover such costs, and the fact that the funds could come from the sale of Iraqi oil.
35 Paragraph 1 of the resolution's substantive provisions then noted the Council's decision, assuming Iraqi willingness, to permit limited petroleum sales to meet the needs of the Iraqi people for food, medicines, and humanitarian supplies, 36 with paragraph 1(b) specifi cally referencing the Security Council's proposal to create a UN escrow account to manage revenues generated by such sales. 37 Paragraph 3 followed this proposal with the expression of the Council that a portion of the revenues also be made available for Compensation Commission claims and expenses attributed to the inspection and disarmament responsibilities of UNSCOM and other weapons inspectors.
38 Even though Iraq rejected Resolution 706 ' s proposal, as well as that offered later in Security Council Resolution 712, 39 the signifi cance of these proposals should not be overlooked, as they served as basic building blocks in the Oil-for-Food Programme's foundation and opened the possibility of renewed export sales of Iraqi hydrocarbons. 40 Oil sales eventually did commence a year or so after the Security Council's adoption 43 The idea of oversight was to ensure both transparency and compliance with certain obligations established by Resolution 986. This was followed by paragraph 1(b) requiring that revenues produced by the sale of Iraqi hydrocarbons were to be paid ' directly by the purchaser … into [an] escrow account … established by the Secretary-General ' . 44 Iraq was not to have control of receipts from oil sales.
Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Resolution 986, the escrow account established by the Secretary-General was to be subjected to scrutiny by an independent auditor and the Secretary-General was required to ' keep the Government of Iraq fully informed ' regarding the account. 45 Paragraphs 8(a) and (b) of Resolution 986 provided for funds in the escrow account to be used in making Oil-for-Food Programme purchases. 46 Under an implementing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concluded with Iraq in mid-1996, the specifi cs of the Oil-for-Food Programme and its escrow account were further spelled out. 47 As alluded to earlier, Security Council Resolution 687 had established a compensation fund associated with claims emerging out of Gulf War I, and a ' Commission ' to administer the fund. 48 Paragraph 8(c) of Resolution 986 picked up on that by requiring the transfer of a portion of the revenues generated by the sale of Iraqi hydrocarbons to that compensation fund. 49 It should be noted that paragraph 15 of Resolution 986 provided that ' the escrow account established for the purposes of this resolution enjoys the privileges and immunities of the United Nations ' . 50 The effect was to provide the escrow account insulation from meaningful legal action.
Distinct from the protection accorded the oil escrow account by the language of paragraph 15, it bears noting that paragraph 14 of Resolution 986, and several paragraphs of Resolution 986 ' s implementing MOU, addressed the basic matter of legal control over and status of Iraqi hydrocarbons. Paragraph 14 noted that ' petroleum 42 See ibid ., at para. 1. 43 See ibid ., at para. 1(a). 44 See ibid ., at para. 1(b). 45 See ibid ., at para. 7. 46 See ibid ., at para. 8(a) and (b). See text accompanying supra notes 28 -29. 49 See SC Res. 986, supra note 41, at para. 8(c). 50 See ibid ., at para. 15. and petroleum products subject to this resolution shall while under Iraqi title be immune from legal proceedings … . ' 51 It also required Member States to take action to assure protection for such under their own domestic legal systems. 52 The notions apparently expressed in these protections were that, until legal title is transferred to a purchaser by an authorized Iraqi government entity, control of Iraqi hydrocarbons was left by the UN in Iraqi hands, and that Iraqi oil and oil products were protected by Resolution 986 against all threatening legal action. 53 From the implementing MOU, the most substantial language is found in paragraphs 1 -5 of Annex II. That Annex sets forth the particulars regarding contractual commitments. In addressing the contract approval process, paragraphs 1 -5 plainly indicated purchase contracts and associated documents were to be endorsed by the government of Iraq or SOMO, the Iraqi state oil marketing organization. 54 It would seem peculiar to have recognized contract endorsement authority, had Iraqi control over its hydrocarbon resources been thought not to exist. On the matter of insulation of Iraqi oil from legal claims as long as title to such remained in Iraqi hands, nothing in the MOU contradicted the language of paragraph 14 of Security Council Resolution 986.
The End of the Invasion Phase of the Second Gulf War: A New Oil Resolution Recognizing a Different Approach
Adopted at the end of the invasion phase of the Second Gulf War, Security Council Resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003, contained several extremely signifi cant principles relevant to the issue of Iraqi oil and the revenues generated from the sale of such.
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These principles were declared against a backdrop that included the ouster of Saddam Hussein, control of the country by US-led military forces and the so-called Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and a desire to assist the Iraqi people in reconstituting a government both democratically elected and capable of directing its own destiny. Given that backdrop, Resolution 1483 ' s principles refl ect a ' paradigm shift ' regarding the treatment of Iraqi oil.
One of the most signifi cant principles of Resolution 1483 was enunciated in paragraph 10. That principle eliminated the embargo on Iraqi trade established by Resolution 661, including the embargo on Member-State importation of Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products. As it provided: ' all prohibitions related to trade with Iraq 51 See ibid ., at para. 14. 52 See ibid .
53
For an analysis of the separate question whether the UN or the US-led occupying forces had the better claim over legal title to Iraqi oil following the Second Gulf War: see Langenkamp and Zedalis, ' An Analysis of Claims Regarding 62 This reaffi rmed the UN's position that not only are the hydrocarbons under the control of Iraq, but they are deemed so integral to the future success of Iraq that until title passes to a purchaser, they are not subject to any form of legal action. But could the same be said about the revenues generated from the sale of hydrocarbons? Again, in line with, but expanding upon Resolution 986 ' s paragraph 15, 63 paragraph 22 of Security Council Resolution 1483 noted further that ' proceeds and obligations 56 See ibid ., at para. 10. 57 See the sources cited supra at note 5. Clearly, there is a difference between arguing that oil is an important reason motivating the coalition's belief that a need existed for the invasion, and arguing that the invasion was motivated by a desire to control Iraqi oil. With respect to the latter, it is extremely interesting that since the invasion, the world price of oil has risen signifi cantly, threatening world-wide recession. Unless one considers the coalition's objective to have been associated with simply raising the profi ts earned by international oil companies, rather than assuring consumer access to cheap oil, invading Iraq to control Iraqi oil seems a false explanation of the coalition's action against Baghdad. 58 See SC Res. 1483, supra note 55, at Preamble, 2nd para. 59 See ibid ., Preamble, 4th para. (emphasis added).
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On the separate and distinct question whether the resolutions provided superior control to the US-led coalition forces or to the UN, see the text and materials accompanying supra note 52. 61 See the text accompanying supra note 51. 62 See SC Res. 1483, supra note 55, at para. 22 (emphasis added). 63 See the text accompanying supra note 50.
arising from sales [of petroleum, petroleum products, or natural gas] … shall enjoy privileges and immunities equivalent to those enjoyed by the United Nations … ' 64 Paragraph 22 supplemented this by obligating Member States to take appropriate measures to assure such protection was accorded under their own domestic legal systems. 65 The same privileges and immunities, and protection in domestic legal systems of Member States, was made applicable as well to the IDF, 66 an entity set up by another provision of Resolution 1482 to assume fi nancial duties associated with past and future sales of Iraqi oil. See the text accompanying infra notes 80 -82. 68 See SC Res. 1483, supra note 55, at para. 18 (emphasis added). 69 See the text accompanying supra notes 22 -23. 70 It should be noted that during the months leading up to the Second Gulf War, and during the period of the military campaign itself, the Oil-for-Food Programme obviously had been suspended. 71 See SC Res., supra note 55, at para. 16. 72 See ibid ., at para. 19. 73 Second, paragraph 20 followed that by noting that proceeds from ' all export sales of petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas from Iraq The establishment of the IDF referenced in paragraphs 17, 20 and 21 of Security Council Resolution 1483 was called for by paragraph 12 in particular. As the language of that provision declared, the Fund was ' to be held by the Central Bank of Iraq ' and subject to independent audit approved by the Fund's International Advisory Monitoring Board (IAMB), comprised of representatives from the UN, IMF and World Bank, among others.
80 Paragraph 14 then indicated that those accessing the Fund were obligated to do so ' in a transparent manner ' , with the objective being to meet humanitarian needs, infrastructure repair and reconstruction, disarmament objectives, costs of civilian administration ' and for other purposes benefi ting the people of 73 See ibid ., at para. 17. For reference to para. 8(a) and (b) of Res. 986, see the text accompanying supra note 46. 74 See ibid ., at para. 20. 75 See the text accompanying supra note 72. 76 See the text accompanying supra notes 69 -72. 77 See the text accompanying supra note 54. 78 See the text accompanying supra note 71. 79 See SC Res. 1483, supra note 55, at para. 21. 80 See ibid ., at para. 12.
Iraq ' . 81 According to paragraph 13 of Security Council Resolution 1483, each and every disbursement from the Fund, had to ' be … at the direction of the [CPA], in consultation with the Iraqi interim administration ' . 82 Clearly, it would be diffi cult to dispute assertions that the provisions of Resolution 1483 evinced a disposition by the Security Council to exercise a degree of authority over Iraqi oil and the revenues produced by its sales. It was the Security Council that chose to lift the embargo on export sales. It was the Security Council that directed Iraqi oil and the revenues from its sales were to be insulated from legal action. It was the Security Council that provided how proceeds from oil sales activities were to be handled and where they were to be spent. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that all this was done in recognition of the political realities that beset Iraq, not in an effort to divest Iraqis from their natural patrimony. Sales had been embargoed to ratchet up international political pressure on Saddam Hussein, and were resumed under the pre-Second Gulf War resolutions to meet humanitarian needs and war compensation claims. With Saddam Hussein removed from power, Resolution 1483 called for Iraqi oil sales to fund full-scale reconstruction costs. Further, Iraqi hydrocarbons, proceeds produced by their sale, and institutions holding and managing such were insulated from legal action in an effort to ensure the availability of self-generated monies for the accomplishment of goals benefi ting the people of Iraq. Security Council directives concerning the handling and the expenditure of sales revenues were adopted to minimize the possibility of misdirection of funds to inappropriate and illegal purposes. The language in Security Council Resolution 1483 speaks convincingly of the international community's desire to recognize the right of the Iraqi people, in exercise of its recognized sovereign independence, to control their oil resources and reap the benefi ts from the sale of such.
Birth of Independence: Security Council Resolutions in Contemplation of Increased Iraqi Control of Oil Resources
On 8 June 2004, less than fi ve weeks prior to the CPA's scheduled handover to Iraqi functionaries of all basic governing authority, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1546. 83 On the matter of control over Iraqi hydrocarbons, the third paragraph of this resolution's Preamble made clear once again the Security Council's respect for the ' independence, sovereignty, … and territorial integrity of Iraq ' . 84 The fourth paragraph followed this by reaffi rming the ' right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources ' . 85 Paragraph 2 of Resolution 1546 ' s substantive provisions emphasized this autonomy and control by 81 See ibid ., at para. 14. 82 See ibid ., at para. 13. 83 See SC Res. 1546, available at www.iraqwatch.org/un//unscresolutions/s-res-1546.pdf (accessed 15 Dec. 2006). 84 See ibid ., at Preamble, 3rd para. 85 See ibid ., at Preamble, 4th para. (emphasis added).
welcoming that the ' occupation will end [30 June 2004] and the Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to exist, and … Iraq will reassert its full sovereignty ' . Paragraph 3 then reaffi rmed the ' right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and to exercise full authority and control over their fi nancial and natural resources ' . From such language in both the Preamble and the substantive provisions, there can be absolutely no question of Iraqi control over all Iraqi resources, hydrocarbon and otherwise. At one time, provisions existed in Security Council resolutions that may have raised questions regarding the nature and extent of Iraq's control over its petroleum and natural gas resources, but Resolution 1546 clearly enunciated the Security Council's position that such resources were under the autonomous and independent authority of the Iraqi people.
It The clear implication from the notion that disbursements were to ' continue ' was that the IDF was to be left intact in order to serve as a repository for revenues from any future sales of hydrocarbons. In connection with this, paragraph 26 provided for a transitioning to the Interim Government of Iraq, and its successors, of all responsibilities and obligations had by the CPA under the Oil-for-Food Programme. 93 Given that, in large measure, the Oil-for-Food Programme was envisioned to be in the process of phasing out, such responsibilities and obligations were seen to be merely ' wrap-up ' in nature.
Of greater signifi cance than paragraph 26, paragraph 24 of Security Council Resolution 1546 provided that rules concerning deposit into the IDF of ' proceeds from export sales of petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas … shall continue to apply ' . 94 In other words, the protections previously established by the United Nations to ensure that revenues from the sale of Iraqi oil were not squandered or misdirected still demanded rigorous compliance. Further, paragraph 24 also noted that, following the CPA's dissolution at the end of June 2004, disbursements from the Development Fund for Iraq ' shall be … solely at the direction of the Government of Iraq ' . 95 In conjunction with this new degree of autonomy, however, that same paragraph 24 continued by observing that all disbursements ' shall be utilized in a transparent and equitable manner and through the Iraqi budget ' and, additionally, that the IAMB, the oversight body established under Resolution 1483, ' shall continue its activities in monitoring the Development Fund for Iraq ' . 96 Plainly, the idea was to acknowledge Iraqi control over revenues from oil sales, yet to do so in a way that recognized the nascent character of Iraq's new governmental regime and all the temptations and pressures it might encounter.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the idea captured in Security Council Resolution 1546 was that of initiating the process of visualizing the Iraqi government as a peer of other governments -without the need for special legal protections, with absolute control over its natural resources, and with greater (though not complete) autonomy in the handling of revenues generated through the sale of those resources. Presumably, as intimated above, one reason for the Security Council holding back with respect to giving Iraq complete discretion on the management of revenues generated through hydrocarbon sales had to do with the realization that, if Iraq were ever to stand on its own as a successful democracy, its crown jewel, its principal national patrimony, its oil and gas deposits, had to be used wisely and not squandered as a result of bad government practices or corruption.
Despite this impetus towards watchfully supervising the use of Iraq's oil revenues, paragraph 25 of Resolution 1546 contained a major concession tilting in the direction of complete autonomy. Specifi cally, it provided that the terms of paragraph 24, dealing with the deposit of hydrocarbon sales revenues into the IDF, and the role of 93 See ibid ., at para. 26. 94 See ibid ., at para. 24. 95 See ibid . 96 See ibid . the IAMB, ' shall be reviewed at the request of the Transitional Government of Iraq or twelve months from the date of [resolution 1546], and shall expire upon the completion of the political process set out in paragraph four above ' . 97 The process set out in paragraph 4 of Resolution 1546 was that which resulted in the drafting of the Iraqi Constitution during the latter half of 2004, 98 and the January 2005 national elections that led to the ascendancy of, fi rst, the Ibrahim al-Jaafri, and then the Nouri al-Maliki, governments.
99 Paragraph 25 ' s plain thrust was towards the eventual elimination of Security Council mandated and IDF/IAMB managed and supervised handling of revenues from the sales of Iraqi oil. This created at least the potential for early, unsupervised Iraqi control over oil sales revenues, while legal claims against Iraqi oil and the IDF remained by mandate in abeyance until 31 December 2007. 100 In recognition of the fact that the political situation in Iraq was not suffi ciently stable to warrant institution of the envisioned unsupervised Iraqi government control over its oil revenues, the Security Council adopted on 11 November 2005 Resolution 1637. 101 Paragraph 3 of that resolution extended both the deposit management authority of the IDF and IAMB's monitoring role until 31 December 2006. 102 Though the extension was important, Resolution 1637 is referenced here primarily because it served as the model for the currently controlling Security Council Resolution 1723, adopted only a few weeks prior to the writing of this essay. 103 The two resolutions largely track each other. Paragraph 3 of Resolution 1723 provides another extension for the IDF and the IAMB, this time until 31 December 2007 , 104 the exact same date that the insulation of Iraqi oil and the IDF from legal claims is scheduled to expire. Aside from this extension, Resolution 1723 ' s signifi cance resides in its continuation of the international community's commitment to the notion of Iraqi oil and natural gas being under the authority of the government of Iraq, with revenues from the sale of such being used for the benefi t of the Iraqi people.
The combination of three specifi c provisions of Security Council Resolution 1723 ' s Preamble strongly suggest this notion. The fourth paragraph of the Preamble begins 97 See ibid . (emphasis added). 98 by reaffi rming, once again, the sovereignty and independence of Iraq. 105 And this is then followed by the Preamble's fi fth paragraph also reaffi rming not only the right of the Iraqi people to determine their own political future, but also to ' control their own national resources ' . 106 Serving as a capstone, paragraph 20 of Resolution 1723 ' s Preamble then notes Security Council recognition of the important role played by the IDF and the IAMB ' in helping the Government of Iraq to ensure that Iraq's resources are being used transparently and equitably for the benefi t of the people of Iraq ' . 107 On occasion, transparency and proper use of revenues produced by the sale of Iraqi hydrocarbon resources have proven problematic. 108 Nonetheless, the international community has found the use of the IDF and the oversight of the IAMB to be far preferable in maximizing the chances of Iraq's oil resources being used for the benefi t of the Iraqi people than the alternative of permitting Iraqi functionaries to assume immediate unsupervised control.
The substantive provisions of Security Council Resolution 1723 basically cover two broad subjects: the reauthorization of the military role of US-led multinational forces in Iraq; and the extension of UN-sponsored mechanisms for the handling of revenues associated with the sale of Iraqi oil and gas. It is the latter that gives legal bite to the idea captured by paragraph 20 of Resolution 1723 ' s Preamble. On that score, paragraph 3 of the Resolution's substantive provisions states the Security Council's decision to extend until 31 December 2007 the duties of both the IDF and the IAMB. 109 This is followed in paragraph 4 by a declaration of the Security Council that the duties of both the IDF and the IAMB ' shall be reviewed at the request of the Government of Iraq or no later than 15 June 2007 ' . 110 It had been just such a formal request by the Iraqi government that resulted in the adoption of Resolution 1723 and its extension of the previous 31 December 2006 end-date for the IDF and IAMB. 111 And as if to drive home the point that, even though the security situation in Iraq continued to occupy much attention, the importance of the IDF and IAMB in assuring the new government the breathing space necessary to structure administrative networks capable of guaranteeing Iraq's oil and the revenues from the sale of such would be used only for the benefi t of the sovereign and independent people of Iraq, the request of the government itself clearly referenced a one-year extension, with a 15 June 2007 review date.
It would be hard to understand this new resolution as doing anything other than continuing the international community's recognition of Iraq's oil and gas as under Iraqi control, with the role of Security Council designated entities as merely supervisory and interim.
General Observations and Suggestions: Effect of the Security Council Regime and How it Could be Enhanced
Though the near and intermediate term economic interests of the US-led coalition in Iraq may suggest insistence on control over Iraqi oil, the UN Security Council resolutions concerning the subject have steadfastly refrained from asserting such. Indeed, as the preceding review of those resolutions indicate, the international community initially asserted authority over Iraqi oil in order to guarantee that it would not provide revenues that could be used for military purposes.
113 It later asserted authority to assure it would produce funds that could be used for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi civilians. 114 And it fi nally asserted authority to reduce the likelihood that funds generated by its permitted export sale would be misdirected away from legitimate post-war reconstruction costs. 115 At every juncture, the Security Council has been concerned with acknowledging the sovereign independence and territorial integrity of Iraq, and the ultimate authority of the Iraqi people to determine the management and disposition of Iraq's national resources. Any UN-asserted authority regarding those resources was envisioned as purely protective, not as indicative of divesting Iraq of superior and ultimate control.
In the context of the current struggles taking place in Iraq over the various questions related to the matter of oil, the existing Security Council resolutions repose the decisive authority in the hands of Iraqis. While coalition allies might attempt to exert infl uence over the many issues connected with how Iraq's oil wealth is to be handled, it is the people of Iraq that the international community has designated as having the ultimate authority to determine how Iraqi oil and the revenues from its sale are to be managed, disposed of, and utilized. As it currently stands, the Iraqi Constitution picks up on this by providing for an extensive role in matters of oil for provincial governmental units. 116 As noted at the outset of this essay, the Kurdish authorities in the north of Iraq adopted provincial legislation in late October 2006 claiming as much autonomy in that respect as they considered permissible under the Constitution.
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How current negotiations will conclude on the role of the central government in the large variety of matters associated with control over and the exploitation of oil, as well 113 See the text accompanying supra notes 25 -27. 114 See the text accompanying supra notes 27 -37. 115 See the text accompanying supra notes 56 -83. 116 as allocation and expenditure of the revenues produced by its sale remains to be seen. In any event, it is absolutely and indubitably clear that the operative and legally binding statements of the Security Council on each and every conceivable issue associated with Iraq's oil recognize that the Iraqi people are to have the fi nal say. Under controlling Security Council resolutions, oversight of the international community and insulation of Iraqi oil revenues from legal claims continue through 31 December 2007, but there is nothing in those resolutions that divests the Iraqi people of the power to decide upon the nature of the legal regime to govern the management, exploitation and sale of Iraqi oil. Even though what the Iraqis fi nally decide upon may not prove especially palatable to members of the US-led coalition, the relevant Security Council resolutions are explicit in recognizing their autonomy to fashion the legal regime they deem most appropriate.
The United States and other coalition allies, as well as the various international oil companies to which the Iraqi's will have to look to resurrect and expand their oil industry, may well desire an Iraqi hydrocarbons legal regime that contains various features deemed favourable to consuming nations and producing industries. In fact, there is every reason to believe that representatives from both consuming nations and producing industries have exerted substantial pressure on those involved in negotiating Iraq's new petroleum legislation to craft a regime that benefi ts the interests for whom those representatives speak. 118 While that should be viewed as neither surprising nor inappropriate, it is indubitably clear that the nature and character of the regime fi nally settled upon by Iraqi negotiators and legislators is envisioned by the controlling Security Council resolutions as being entirely and exclusively within the sovereign and independent prerogative of the Iraqi people. Iraqis may submit to the overtures and entreaties of interested outside parties, or they may thoroughly reject the persuasiveness of, and rebuff the pressures inherent in, such parties ' arguments. The UN Security Council resolutions leave no question but that the Iraqi people have control over their petroleum resources and are vested with the exclusive and sole power to decide upon the legal regime to govern them. Moreover, that power is not just confi ned to whether it is the Iraqis or the international community that decides upon the contours of Iraq's future oil and gas legal regime. It also includes the power in Iraqis to decide wisely or foolishly regarding the particulars, the nuts and bolts of that legal regime. The Security Council may once have asserted authority over Iraqi oil and gas, and the proceeds of its sale, to assure revenues were not used for illegal weapons activities or that they were used to fund the humanitarian and reconstruction needs of the people of that nation. At present, however, the resolutions of the Council make clear that the international community respects the sovereign independence of the new Iraqi government and recognizes it has a right equivalent to that of all other sovereign nations to exercise full and decisive control over its own natural resources.
And additionally, not one idea appears in the relevant Security Council resolutions that goes so far as to establish precise substantive standards that must be refl ected in any new legal regime crafted by Iraqi negotiators to regulate oil and gas activities. In a word, the United Nations accepts that the Iraqi people have ' plenary ' authority over their hydrocarbon resources.
But quite apart from the matter of Iraq's hydrocarbons being under the exclusive and absolute control of the Iraqi people, serious potential problems remain in connection with the existence of the Security Council's current deadline on the protection of Iraqi oil and gas, and proceeds and obligations from its sale, in regards to legal claims that might involve such. As is well known, the costs of the reconstruction and security operations in Iraq have been staggering, to say the least. Any effort likely to produce over the long term a semblance of success will require a continued fi nancial commitment of substantial magnitude. Despite the fact that legitimate questions may exist with respect to whether the chances of success or the benefi ts that might potentially emerge from such warrant embracing that kind of expensive and prolonged commitment, there would seem little disagreement that widely opening the doors of the courthouse to those who would seek access to the only prominent income-producing national asset controlled by the Iraqi people could seriously jeopardize the apparently slim prospect Iraq has of securing civil stability and resurrecting itself as a contributing member of the world community.
Aside from the estimated $700 billion that will have been expended by the US on reconstruction and security efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan by the end of 2008, 119 the government in Baghdad is thought by some to have had pre-war debts to foreign governments and non-governmental entities totalling in the vicinity of $400 billion. 120 At Iraq's current oil production rate of around 2 million barrels per day (mbpd), 121 considering the present $60 per barrel price on the international market, sales should generate gross revenues of around $44 billion annually. In the event that suffi cient improvements in Iraqi production techniques and political stability can be restored to permit reaching the 3 mbpd level, annual sales could bring in approximately $65 billion in gross revenues. Revenues at either level, however, would have to be reduced to refl ect exploration and production expenses and other costs. And to the extent that production activities represent a collaborative venture with international oil companies or other outside business and labour forces, it would be completely unreasonable to expect governmental authorities within Iraq to have anything half-way close to profi ts approximating revenues earned by the actual sales made on the international market.
For the purposes of analysis, if Iraqi oil sales generated net profi ts available for expenditure in the vicinity of $25 -35 billion annually, it would barely be enough to cover that nation's existing annual budget. 122 Given the well-known and highly publicized inadequacies in Iraq's basic infrastructure and social services, it would seem unlikely that anyone would suggest that current budget fi gures are not to be expected to increase rather signifi cantly. While it is true that in the immediate wake of the 123 this appears to have represented yet another overly optimistic assessment associated with the Iraq campaign. There can be no quibbling with the fact that Iraqi oil sales are likely to generate considerable sums of cash on an annual basis. Indeed, given estimates of that nation's oil reserves, at present pricing levels total revenues over the life of the oil fi elds are likely to top, on the very low end, at least $7 trillion. 124 Without a doubling or tripling of anticipated near-term production levels, however, it appears improbable that Iraq will be prepared to easily and painlessly pay off any of its pre-war or post-war creditors. And this makes re-extending insulation of the Iraqi government from legal claims against its oil and gas, and the revenues from the sale of such, a terribly important matter for the international community to address.
The mid-November 2004 so-called Paris Club agreement was a partial move in that direction. By virtue of that agreement, 19 major industrial nations, including the United States, Germany, the UK and France agreed to reduce the amount of debt owed them by Iraq. Working on the basis of an Iraqi debt to the concerned governments of $38.9 billion, the parties consented to a reduction by 80 per cent to a fi gure of $7.8 billion. 125 From indications, the US had apparently wanted a reduction of as much as 95 per cent, while European nations had insisted upon a reduction not exceeding the 50 per cent level. Under those circumstances, the 80 per cent reduction agreement refl ected a compromise position. 126 The agreement, of course, had no applicability to debts owed non-Paris Club nations, nor to those held by private or non-state entities.
Why would it not make sense for the UN to take an approach analogous to that refl ected in the Paris Club agreement and adopt a new Security Council resolution insulating Iraqi oil, and the revenues produced by its sale, from legal claims associated with all pre-war obligations and post-war security and reconstruction debts? It certainly appears that the international community has no insuperable philosophical objection to the basic concept of such insulation, lest how would one explain the already extant and previously referenced legal protection bestowed by the Security Council upon Iraq. 127 And surely there can be no doubt that the amount of money involved with pre-and post-war claims could easily overwhelm the budgetary demands on Iraq for virtually every cent of the revenues produced by Iraqi oil and gas sales activity. Against this background, there seems more than adequate reason for the Security Council to consider adoption of a new resolution providing insulation to Iraqi hydrocarbons and their revenues from legal proceedings by claimants as an appropriate and prescient action. Financial resources essential because of the current exigencies faced in Iraq would be assured of commitment to efforts targeting the stabilization and buttressing of Baghdad's fragile fl edgling democracy. Any effort to open such resources to being diverted to satisfying fi nancial claims of creditors would seem to go a long way towards condemning that democracy to abject failure.
The precise contours of a new Security Council resolution could vary substantially. It might be that such a resolution could closely track the Paris Club agreement and, for a designated number of years, exempt from pre-and post-war claims by creditors, 80 per cent of the revenues generated by Iraqi oil and gas sales. Conversely, a new resolution might provide for the continuation of the IDF, or the establishment of a similar entity, and permit the Iraqi government to funnel a specifi c percentage of oil and gas sales revenues into such, with those revenues and the managing entity being accorded complete immunity from legal action. Indeed, there would seem at least four major areas that any new resolution must address. First, as just intimated, the resolution should provide protection for revenues produced by oil and gas sales activities. Second, it should insulate from legal claims those governmental or quasi-governmental entities charged with the responsibility of managing and administering either such revenues or the production and sales generating them. Third, it should also speak to the matter of Iraqi oil and gas proper having immunity from attachment or other form of legal action, whether that oil and gas be in the hands of Iraqis or others. After all, the likelihood of sales and consequent revenues can be seriously diminished if oil and gas that has been lifted or is still in the ground can be subjected to various forms of legal proceedings. And fourth, as with earlier resolutions, any new effort by the Security Council to address the question of immunity from legal claims should require UN Member States to implement the adopted scheme through national legislation.
Irrespective of various approaches that might be taken to structure a new Security Council resolution, with upwards of $400 billion in pre-war debt alone, in the neighbourhood of $44 billion annually in oil and gas gross revenues, and existing annual budgetary expenditures of around $35 billion, there seems little question that simply permitting legal claimants unfettered access to the judicial system for immediate and total satisfaction of all debts would have disastrous consequences for efforts to rebuild a sound nation that is both a helpful and a dependable member of the community of states. Only ingenuity and creativity limit the nature of legal protection that could be afforded by a new Security Council resolution. But no matter the content and structure of insulation provided by any such resolution, there seems every reason to believe that subjecting the nascent Iraqi democracy to precisely the same level of susceptibility to legal action as faced by all other sovereign states would seriously imperil its ability to meet the basic needs of its citizenry and, thus, frustrate the chances of democracy fi rmly taking hold and fl ourishing.
Conclusion
The reported version of the Iraqi central government's draft oil and gas law is currently navigating the political processes required for it to become effective.
128 Though political pundits, foreign governmental offi cials, international oil company executives, or hard-headed economists may ultimately challenge the wisdom of the particular provisions contained in that draft law, there can be little disagreement that a long line of Security Council resolutions vests the people of Iraq and their elected representatives with the autonomous power to settle upon what they think best for their oil and gas resources. As those resolutions have evolved, they have recognized the need to insulate Iraq's hydrocarbon resources, and the revenues produced by their sales, from judicial proceedings initiated by legal claimants. That insulation has been driven by the realization that Iraq and its peoples have faced urgent needs, the satisfaction of which could well have been frustrated had every creditor or claimant with a legitimate or plausible demand been provided the latitude to commence proceedings aimed at Iraqi oil and gas, or the revenues from such.
While the Iraqis may have complete liberty to manage and control the exploitation and use of their natural resources, the country itself remains in a precarious and unstable situation, threatening to tip into total anarchy and all-out civil war. And as long as the economic situation in the nation remains tenuous and unable to even meet the basic needs of most Iraqis, the chances for the nation's new-found democracy do not appear sanguine. If the economic situation is to be turned around, thereby providing at least a modicum of opportunity for the political environment to be stabilized and democracy preserved, Iraq will need access to as much of its oil-and gas-based revenues as possible. A reasonable course of action to achieve this goal would seem to be a new Security Council resolution insulating Iraq's oil and gas, and the revenues from its sales, from legal proceedings of pre-and post-war claimants.
Yet time is running out. The protections from legal action that have been provided by the Security Council in the past are due to expire at the end of 2007. While the Iraqi national government currently focuses on securing successful adoption and 128 implementation of its draft oil and gas law, and beginning the long process of creating measures dealing with the allocation in the country of the revenues produced by oil and gas sales, and formulation of standard contracts to govern relationships with international exploration and exploitation companies, the signifi cance of protecting from creditors both the revenues generated by oil and gas activity and the oil and gas itself, remains a matter of terribly vital importance. What does it matter the form taken by Iraq's law governing oil and gas, or the nature of the regional allocation of proceeds from sales, or the structure of the legal relationship with international oil companies, if pre-and post-war creditors acquire unobstructed access to the courts for satisfying their claims? In the absence of continued UN-approved insulation from such claims, the monies necessary to permit the new Iraqi democracy a chance of survival will most likely vanish.
